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Deceit, Difference in Value and Date of Assessment 
Andrew Summers1 and Adam Kramer2 
 
In OMV Petrom SA v Glencore International AG [2016] EWCA Civ 778, the Court of 
Appeal assessed damages for deceit following fraudulent misrepresentation by the 
seller of several cargos of oil. The court considered the application of the “date of 
assessment” principles developed in Smith New Court Securities Ltd v Citibank NA 
[1997] A.C. 254; [1996] 4 All E.R. 769, in circumstances in which the buyer had not 
discovered the fraud until several years after the oil had been refined and sold to sub-
buyers. The dispute centred on whether the sub-sales, concluded after the fraud took 
place, could be relied upon by the fraudulent seller to reduce the damages payable to 
buyer. The Court of Appeal concluded that they could not. Whilst it is difficult to have 
sympathy for the fraudster in these circumstances, the court’s approach involves a 
misunderstanding of the date of assessment principles established in Smith New Court 
Securities and other more recent decisions. 
 
Between 1993 and 1996, the defendant seller supplied around 80 cargos of crude oil to 
the claimant Romanian state oil company on CIF Constantza terms. All of the cargos 
were sold as established “brands” of crude that the claimant preferred for its refineries. 
However, unbeknownst to the claimant, 32 of the 80 cargos were in fact bespoke blends 
of other crudes that the defendant had deliberately mixed to resemble brands and then 
disguised by forged documents. These bespoke blends were cheaper to produce and 
supply than the brands, but had similar characteristics and yields, so the deception could 
not be and was not initially detected by the claimant (who tested the cargos) or its banks. 
The fraud was only discovered a decade later from a whistleblower. By that time the 
claimant had long-since supplied the cargos to its subsidiary oil refining companies, 
which had refined the oil and sold the products to their customers. 
 
At first instance, Flaux J. held that the defendant was liable in deceit and assessed 
damages as being the difference between the price that the claimant had paid for the 
cargos (on the basis that they were branded crude) and the market value of the bespoke 
blends fraudulently substituted by the defendant. The components of the bespoke 
blends together had a market value approximately $14m less than those of the brands. 
To this Flaux J. added a further “discount” of around $26m to reflect the lower price at 
which bespoke blends tended to sell as compared with equivalent established brands, 
because of the additional uncertainties that arose from using untried blends in the 
refining process. The date for assessing the relevant market value was taken to be the 
date of the bill of lading (which the parties agreed was more appropriate than the date 
of the contract). 
 
On appeal as to the assessment of damages, the defendant argued that Flaux J.’s award 
overcompensated the claimant in light of subsequent events. In particular, it argued that 
the discount reflected the risks that an untried blend might result in lower than expected 
yields or damage to the buyer’s refinery, but as things turned out, none of these risks 
eventuated. Instead, the defendant argued, damages should be assessed using a 
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“comparative yield” approach, which involved comparing the yields that would have 
been obtained by the promised brands with the yields in fact obtained from the 
fraudulently supplied bespoke blends. 
 
The Court of Appeal rejected the defendant’s arguments and upheld Flaux J.’s award. 
It concluded that in a case where property is acquired as a result of the defendant’s 
fraud, the loss was the overpayment (at [40] and [77]) and “the basic measure of 
damages is the price paid less… its value at the date of acquisition” (at [38]). In the 
present case, this valuation was to be carried out as at the bill of lading date, that “being 
the date upon which [the claimant’s] loss crystallized”; further, “[w]hat happened after 
the bill of lading date does not affect the value of the blend on that date” (at [49]) and 
so “the fact that refining led to no problems [was] something which should enure to the 
benefit of [the claimant]” (at [61]). The decision thus appears to accord with the so-
called “breach date rule”, that damages are assessed “as at” the date of breach (in this 
case the bill of lading date) regardless of subsequent events, at least where those 
subsequent events make things better and not worse for the claimant. 
 
In reaching its conclusion, the Court of Appeal considered the principles set out in 
Smith New Court Securities. There, the House of Lords held that in a deceit case 
(although expressly referring to other tort cases) the value of property acquired should 
usually be taken as at the date of acquisition, however “such general rule is not to be 
inflexibly applied” (at 267 per Lord Browne-Wilkinson). In reviewing this authority, 
the Court of Appeal in OMV reasoned that “[t]he purpose of the flexibility of approach 
about the valuation date to which Lord Browne-Wilkinson referred was to ensure that 
the person duped should not suffer an injustice by failing to recover full compensation 
... There is no need to adopt such an approach in order to relieve the fraudster from the 
general rule as to damages” (at [39]; see also [169] in the decision of Flaux J.). In other 
words, the Court of Appeal considered that departure from the so-called “general rule” 
could only work one way: in favour of the innocent party, but never to the advantage 
of the wrongdoer. 
 
The defendant’s status as a fraudster clearly weighed heavily in the Court of Appeal’s 
reasoning, which emphasised a policy of discouraging wrongdoing and preventing the 
defendant from profiting from its wrong (at [57] and [78]). However, for deterrence or 
punishment, the claimant and court could have looked to the criminal law, which in 
England and Wales would have included fraud/deception offences. The approach in 
OMV is contrary to the legal principle that mitigation and causation apply in exactly 
the same way regardless of the defendant’s intentional wrongdoing. In Smith New Court 
Securities, although the House of Lords held that the remoteness rule did not apply to 
cases of fraud, it emphasised that “it must still be shown that the entire loss suffered by 
[the defendant] is a direct consequence of the fraudulently induced transaction” (Lord 
Browne-Wilkinson at 267 and Lord Steyn at 281-5); in particular, mitigation “has no 
special features in the context of deceit” (at 285 per Lord Steyn). 
 
Writing in this journal ((2014) 130 L.Q.R. 259), we have previously highlighted the 
fallacy of the breach date rule, explaining that it is really just a common but not 
invariable incident of mitigation, which is itself an aspect of causation. This 
understanding of mitigation and its application to the market rule has subsequently been 
put beyond doubt by the Supreme Court in Bunge SA v Nidera BV [2015] UKSC 43; 
[2015] 3 All E.R. 1082 at [17] per Lord Sumption and at [76]-[82] per Lord Toulson. 
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Unfortunately, the decision in OMV exhibits several of the errors that we cautioned 
against in our article. It marks an unwelcome return to viewing the difference in value 
at the date of breach as though it were an abstract measure of damages (for a rebuttal 
of this view, see 266-269 of our 2014 article), whereas its application is really limited 
to circumstances in which the claimant could have resorted to the market to obtain 
substitute performance, but chose not to. 
 
The first main error exhibited in OMV was the failure, at both first instance and in the 
Court of Appeal, to assess what would have happened but for the defendant’s breach. 
Under the compensatory principle, it is axiomatic that damages aim to put the claimant 
in the same position as if the breach had not occurred. As we have previously explained, 
the application of this principle requires a comparison between the position that the 
claimant is in as a result of the breach (the “breach position”) and the hypothetical 
position that it would have been in but for the breach (the “non-breach position”). 
 
At first instance, Flaux J. found that if the defendant had disclosed the true position that 
the cargos included bespoke blends rather than brands, then “everything would have 
unraveled and [the claimant] would either have not paid at all or insisted upon 
reimbursement” (at [26]). However, this does not complete the assessment of the 
claimant’s non-breach position, because it omits any finding as to what the claimant 
would have done instead. There were two main possibilities. The claimant might either 
have rejected the defendant’s cargos altogether and purchased the required brands 
elsewhere, or it might alternatively have continued with the purchase of the defendant’s 
bespoke blends, but at a lower price. Although Flaux J. acknowledged both of these 
possibilities, he did not seem to think that it was necessary to choose between them (at 
[14], [19] and [157]). 
 
Yet, the distinction between buying different cargos or buying the same cargos for less 
is of the utmost importance. If the evidence had shown that the claimant would still 
have purchased the blends but at a lower price, then it would be true to say that the 
fraud caused the claimant to “overpay”, and correct to award damages by reference to 
the discount that would have been secured but for the deceit. But on this basis there 
would be no need to ask about the value of the cargos actually acquired, whether at the 
date of breach or any other date, because these cargos would have been acquired 
anyway. This was exactly the approach taken by the Court of Appeal in the deceit case 
of Clef Aquitaine Sarl v Laporte Materials (Barrow) Ltd [2001] QB 488; [2000] 3 
W.L.R. 1760, where it was held that the claimant “suffered no loss from the transaction 
save only from having entered into that transaction rather than a still more profitable 
one” (at 498 per Simon Brown L.J.). 
 
However, on the evidence in OMV, the Clef Aquitaine approach is inapposite. The 
claimant contended that it would have rejected the defendant’s cargos altogether and 
purchased the desired brands elsewhere on the market (at [176] of Flaux J.’s judgment 
and [33] of the appeal judgment). Despite regarding the claimant’s hypothetical conduct 
as mostly unimportant, the Court of Appeal seemed willing to accept this evidence (at 
[11]).  On this basis, although in some sense the claimant “overpaid” for the oil actually 
supplied, this sum does not constitute the claimant’s loss in a legal sense. The 
overpayment relies on a comparison between the price actually paid versus the oil 
actually received, whereas the compensatory principle requires a comparison with what 
would have happened but for the breach, and based on the available evidence, this 
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involved the purchase of different oil at the same (or a similar) price. The correct 
comparison is therefore between the consequences of receiving bespoke blended oil 
(the breach position) as against receiving branded oil (the non-breach position). 
 
The Court of Appeal’s second error was to overlook the important fact that the claimant 
was unaware of the fraud when it supplied onwards the oil (and when its subsidiaries 
refined the oil and sold the products on). Where a buyer of goods is instantly aware of 
the breach, it can usually mitigate its loss by resorting promptly to the market to 
purchase substitute goods of the contractual specification. In these circumstances, as 
Lord Toulson summarised in Bunge, the defendant “is not liable to the innocent party 
for the adverse effect of market changes … nor is the innocent party required to give 
credit to the guilty party for any subsequent market movement in favour of the innocent 
party” because “[t]he speculation which way the market will go is the speculation of 
the claimant” (at [80]). Damages are assessed as if the claimant had resorted to the 
market at the date of breach, even if in fact it did not; this is what often gives the illusion 
of a “breach date rule”. 
 
However, the breach date assessment only applies where the claimant had a “free choice 
whether to re-enter the market” at that date (Bunge at [80] per Lord Toulson; see further, 
in deceit, Toulson J.’s earlier comments in Standard Chartered Bank v Pakistan 
National Shipping Corp [1999] 1 All E.R. (Comm) 417; [1999] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 747 at 
432-433). In another recent decision, Fulton Shipping Inc v Globalia Business Travel 
SAU (“The New Flamenco”) [2016] EWCA Civ 1299; [2016] 1 W.L.R. 2450, the Court 
of Appeal similarly emphasised that the market price rule “depends on there being an 
available market which the innocent party decides for reasons of his own to ignore” (at 
[25] per Longmore L.J.). It follows that this rule has no application where for whatever 
reason the claimant had no choice to resort to the market for substitute performance. 
On the facts of OMV, the claimant had no choice to sell the bespoke blends and purchase 
replacement brands, because it had already supplied the blends to its subsidiaries by the 
time it discovered the fraud. In these circumstances, there is no speculation or other 
break in the chain of causation and the defendant is responsible for all of the actual 
consequences of the breach, for better or worse. 
 
Thus, in OMV the Court of Appeal misunderstood the importance of the distinction 
between patent and latent breaches. As we have previously highlighted, this distinction 
fully explains the two apparently irreconcilable Court of Appeal decisions in Slater v 
Hoyle & Smith Ltd [1920] 2 K.B. 11 and Bence Graphics International Ltd v Fasson 
UK Ltd [1998] Q.B. 87; [1997] 3 W.L.R. 205. In Slater the claimants were aware of 
the breach but then freely chose not to resort to the market to purchase substitute goods; 
by contrast in Bence the claimants did not discover the breach until after they had 
already sold on the defective goods to sub-buyers. In OMV, the Court of Appeal rejected 
the application of Bence on the mistaken basis that it was inconsistent with the earlier 
decision in Slater (at [45]). However, the two cases are distinguishable and it is Bence 
not Slater that provides the apt analogy to OMV, because in the latter case the claimant 
only discovered the fraud long after the oil had already been supplied on. 
 
Where the claimant is unaware of the breach, the rules of mitigation and “legal 
causation” have no application; unless the remoteness rule applies, there is thus no legal 
principle to prevent all actual harms and benefits up to the date of trial being taken into 
account in the assessment of the claimant’s loss. In other words, a simple application 
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of compensatory principle is all that is required. In OMV, it was accepted that the 
claimant’s use of the blends might have resulted in significant harm from fire or rust 
damage to the claimant’s subsidiaries’ refineries, or through impaired yields (at [31]). 
If these losses had been suffered, they would have been recoverable in full (and without 
any application of the remoteness principle, which is inapplicable in cases of deceit). 
This follows directly from the decision in Smith New Court Securities. 
 
However, it is important to be clear about why subsequent events were taken into 
account in Smith New Court Securities. It was not because the defendant was a 
fraudster, as the Court of Appeal in OMV appeared to assume (at [39] and [69]). Instead 
it was because, as Lord Steyn reasoned, the claimant "was truly locked into the 
transaction by reason of the fraud perpetrated on it and the causative influence of the 
fraud is not significantly attenuated or diluted by other causative factors acting 
simultaneously with or subsequent to the fraud" (at 285). As Lord Browne-Wilkinson 
also observed, the claimant was "not aware of the fraud" and "the fraud continue[d] to 
influenc[e] the conduct of the plaintiff after the transaction is complete"; until it 
discovered the breach, the claimant was not "freed from any continuing adverse impact 
of the defendant's wrongful act" (at 261 and 266). This reasoning applies in exactly the 
same way to subsequent gains as to losses. In other words, even if the shares had risen 
in value in Smith New Court Securities between the date of acquisition and the date of 
discovery, giving the deceived claimant a profit, the claimant could not have opted to 
recover the difference between the price paid and the value of the shares at the date of 
acquisition. The application or non-application of the rules of mitigation and causation 
always cut both ways. 
 
As things turned out in OMV, the only actual harm proved by the claimant was the 
relatively small reduction in the value of the distillate yield, valued at around $5.5m, as 
the claimant group apparently refined and sold on the bespoke blends without any other 
adverse consequences (or, at least, none were evidenced or proved: [47]). Further, this 
$5.5m was a loss to the subsidiaries not the claimant, and the claimant led no evidence 
that a reduced yield at its subsidiaries’ refineries would affect the price paid to it or the 
value of the claimant’s shares in the subsidiaries. The claimant had taken the high risk 
approach of seeking jackpot damages without pleading its actual losses even as an 
alternative measure (c.f. Senate Electrical Wholesalers Ltd v Alcatel Submarine 
Networks Ltd [1999] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 423 per Stuart-Smith L.J. at [54]). On a correct 
application of the principles developed in Smith New Court Securities it should have 
paid the price for this approach and recovered no damages at all. 
 
We reiterate the view that date of assessment problems are really aspects of mitigation 
and causation, and not an invitation for judges to exercise discretion based on policy or 
other considerations. Since our earlier article, several cases including Hirtenstein v Hill 
Dickinson LLP [2014] EWHC 2711 (Comm) at [117]ff and Thai Airways International 
Public Company Ltd v KI Holdings Co Ltd [2015] EWHC 1250 (Comm); [2016] 1 All 
E.R. (Comm) 675 at [33]ff, as well as Bunge and The New Flamenco mentioned above, 
have confirmed that approach (although none of these were cited to the court in OMV). 
And Smith New Court Securities already made clear that mitigation and causation apply 
no differently in deceit to other cases. In OMV, the proper award should have been 
compensation for all actual losses proven to have been suffered up to trial and beyond. 
In this case, because the claimant chose to resist investigation of post-acquisition events 
(at [178] in the decision of Flaux J.), those losses were zero. 
